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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

CONDITIONAL WILLS AND WILLS WITH CONDITIONS
IN PENNSYLVANIA
by
A. J. WHITE HUTTON'
In a recent case' our Supreme Court in an opinion by Allen M Stearne, J
follows Moore's Estate2 explaining the distinction between wills that are actually
conditional from those in which the testator merely states the occasion for the
writing of the instrument. In the Morrison case the decree of the Orphans' Court
was reversed and the appeal from probate dismissed. The words of the instrument
were:
"Nov 29 Dear Frank if I never se you again I wont you to have
everything I own keep this it may be of use to you some day your Father

J. H. Morrison."
This case is the inspiration for the following resume on the topic of conditional wills and wills with conditions.
A will may be conditional either as to its operation as such or as to a particular disposition contained therein.
Concerning conditions generally Bigelow has said:2
"A thing is made dependent upon a condition when it is made dependent upon an uncertain event, act or omission.
"The event, act or omission may be past, present, or future. In a
sense a thing present or past cannot be uncertain; such a thing is a fact,
and hence has or has not taken place, or exists or does not exist; but
whether it has taken place or now exists may not be known, and a thing
is uncertain within the meaning of the definition, if, though present or
past, knowledge of the fact is unknown to the person who creates the
condition."
Conditions may be either precedent or subsequent. In the- first class they must
happen or be performed before the estate, right or obligation takes effect. In the
second class are those whose effect is not produced until after the vesting of the
estate or bequest or the commencement of the obligation.
In the present discussion conditional wills are first considered, then wills
containing particular conditions.
* A.B., Gettysburg College. 1897; A.M., Gettysburg College, 1899; LL.B., Harvard University,
1902; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1902-; Member of Pennsylvania House of
Representatives, 1931-1935; Author of HUTTON ON WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA; Member of
the Pennsylvania and Franklin County Bar Associations. Member of Advisory Committee, Law of
Decedent's Estates and Trusts, Joint State Government Commission of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
1 In Re Morrison's Est., 361 Pa. 419 (April 11, 1949) 65 A.2d. 384.
2 332 Pa. 257 (1938) 2 A.2d. 761.
8 The Law of Wills (Student Ed.) 263.
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A conditional will is one whose operation as a valid will depends upon the
happening or the fulfillment of some condition precedent. The condition, therefore,
affects the entire will and not merely a portion thereof.
Text writers generally agree that the policy of the law is to construe such
wills as unconditional and merely expressing an inducement for its execution
where, as in most cases, the testator uses expressions explanatory of just why the
will has been prepared at the particular time. However, until recently, the trend
of the Pennsylvania cases had been the other way. Over a century ago there arose
a case which had very powerfully affected the law in this state by reason of the
glamour of Chief Justice Gibson's name. In Todd's IW/ill 4 the testator prefaced
his will with these words:
"My wish, desire, and intention, now is, that if I should not return,
(which I will, no preventing providence), what I own shall be divided
as follows:"
Then followed some general and specific bequests of a moderate total value, with
the remainder of the estate to testator's wife.
A caveat was sustained by the Register's Court rejecting the paper offered
for probate. In affirming the decree of the court below refusing to admit the will
to probate, Gibson, C.J. declared:
"No textwriter seems to have distinguished between a condition
attached to a particular testamentary disposition, and a condition attached
to the operation of the instrument. But in Parsons v. Lance, 1 Vez. S. R.
191, Lord Hardwicke said without hesitation that he would not require
an authority for such a distinction, and that a paper subject to a condition
ought not to be admitted to probate after failure of the contingency on
the happening of which it was to have taken effect. Why should it be
proved as a will, when it could not have the effect of one? . . . The
testator, in contemplation of a journey to the State of Indiana, for the
amendment of his health, then in an advanced state of decline, begins an
informal testamentary paper addressed to his friend and intended executor in these very distinctive words (quoting the words already given).
He then proceeds to give his property in reference to the state of his
family as it then existed."
The Court then states that according to the facts the arrangement was intended to
be provisional and not to serve in the event of his death at home and the will was
decided to have been conditional upon the facts as they appeared at the time of
the execution of the will.
It is doubtful whether this interpretation is correct as it appears the will was
in no way unusual or inapplicable to the situation at the time of death. Rather it
would seem the testator was stating the occasion impelling the making of a will at
the particular time. The testator actually died about a month after the return from
4 2 W. & S. 145 (1841).
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the journey. Forty-six years later in Morrow's Appeal" the testamentary words were
as follows:
"I am going to town with my drill and i ain't feeling good and in
case i shoulden dget back do as i say on this paper."
The testator went to town and while away became ill but was brought home where
he soon died in the same illness. The Register of Wills refused to admit this
alleged will to probate and the Orphans' Court of Perry County affirmed this
conclusion in an opinion reviewing other cases on the subject. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decree upon the "very lucid and exhaustive opinion of the learned
court below in this case." Said Green, J.:
"A testament is to take place if there is no return. But, there was a
return in both instances (referring to Todd's Will and the present case)
and the testament does not transpire. There is no will because the condition on which it was to come into existence has not occurred. In both
cases the deceased did not return.
"It is useless to speculate as to what the deceased would have done
had he forseen the precise facts which were to happen. He has made no
provision for them."
Like Todd's Will, in this case there were no facts in the will indicative of
peculiar conditions which the testator was seeking to take care of at the precise
time of the execution of the will, and the only evidence of a condition was contained in the opening words of the will already quoted.
It is very doubtful whether either of the aforegoing cases represents a true
type of conditional will. In Todd's Will, supra. Gibson, C. J. relied upon certain
English Cases which have since been more or less questioned and in Morrow's
Appeal the ruling followed Todd's Will with little attempt to distinguish or to
maintain any independence of view.
However, in Forquer'sEstaieG there is an example of very careful consideration of all of the authorities and although the two cases just discussed were not
criticized but rather distinguished, nevertheless the departure is well marked. In
this case the testator directed as follows:
"I intend starting tomorrow morning to Montana to see my brother.
Knowing the uncertainty and risk of a journey, know all persons that I
do hereby will and bequeath..."
After leaving his real and personal property to his wife, the testator further declared:
"And should anything befall me while away or that I should die,
then in that event all my estate, etc."
It was held that the will was not solely contingent upon testator's death on his
journey but continued operative after a safe return and his death thereafter.
6 116 Pa. 440 (1887) 9 A. 660, 2 Am. St. Rep. 616.
6 216 Pa. 331 (1907) 66 A. 92, 8 Ann. Cas. 1146. See Wills Act of 1947, Section 6. Report

of Joint State Government Commission, Page 40, for change in the Jaw as to oral republication.

CONDITIONAL WILLS

There was evidence of a republication and therefore it may be said that in
part the case went off that 'point. However, in a very able opinion Galbraith, P.J.,
reviewed the entire list of cases and then concluded that in the facts under consideration there was no conditional will. The learned court laid down the following rule which was later adopted per curiam by the Supreme Court:
"When the event which constitutes the contingency expressed in the
instrument can be reasonably construed to have been the occasion for
making the will at a particular time, rather than as the reason for making
it in a particular way, it should be so construed; and further, that unless it
clearly appear from the instrument itself that it was not to operate in
a certain event, it will be entitled to probate."
Continuing the learned judge observed:
"Having arrived at the conclusion that the will under consideration
was absolute in character and not contingent, and there being no evidence
of its subseuqent revocation, it would seem unnecessary to determine the
contention of proponent's counsel that the testator, a few days before his
death, in the presence of his wife and another, did republish his will. The
evidence, however, of what took place at that time is uncontradicted and
is sufficient to establish a republication of the will, and the will so republished is, we think, relieved of the contingency expressed therein, the
event having been passed. This would seem not only reasonable but to be
supported by authority. In Schouler on Wills, sec. 287, it is said: 'But
where a will, written as though conditional upon a long journey, is reexecuted and duly witnessed after the testator's safe return, the condition
ceases, and the will may fully operate by remaining uncancelled.' We see
no reason why this rule should not govern where, instead of a re-execution
of the will, there has been a republication of it, supported by the necessary evidence."
The will was accordingly admitted to probate and this decree was affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
Following Forquers Estate, supra, Wbittaker's Estate8 was decided by the
Supreme Court in a per curiam affirming the decree of the lower court. The facts
were that testatrix left in her safe a large sealed envelope marked on the outside
"to be opened by Ike if I do not come back." This envelope contained a second
sealed envelope marked, "If I do not come back this is my will." In this second
envelope was found a testamentary paper dated February 4, 1899 signed by the
decedent and attested by two witnesses. The endorsements on the outside of the
envelopes were in the handwriting of the decedent as well as the body of the paper
found in the envelope. Apparently the endorsements were not signed and there
was no reference made in the testamentary paper to the writings on the envelopes,
nor was there any reference to any proposed journey. It appeared however that
about the time of the execution of the instrument the testatrix did make a trip
to Florida and returned to her home about a month later. The paper was admitted
I' Oral republication of itself shall be inefftctive to revive a will." Wills Act of 1947. Sec. 6.
s 219 Pa. 646 (1908) 69 A. 39.
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to probate and Isaac R. Whittaker, the husband surviving, appealed alleging either
that the paper was a conditional will or that the publication thereof was conditional and that it should not be admitted to probate. Over, J., opined:
"If a testamentary paper signed by Mrs. Whittaker had contained
the sentence, 'IfI do not come back this is my will,' endorsed on the envelope in which the paper was found, it would have been a conditional
will, contingent upon her death on the journey she contemplated when
the paper was executed, and as she returned from her journey it would
be inoperative. There is nothing in the paper, however, indicating that
the testamentary disposition made therein was contingent; no reference
is made to the writing on the envelope in which the paper was found
inclosed; and as the writing was not signed by her it cannot be treated
as part of the will, nor as a codicil to it: Plumstead's Appeal, 4 S. & R.
545; Jacoby's Estate, 190 Pa. 382; Willing's Estate, 212 Pa. 136; In
Forquer'sEstate, 216 Pa. 331, in an able and exhaustive opinion which
was adopted by the Supreme Court, Judge Galbraith held that 'Unless it
appears from the will itself that it was not to operate in a certain event
it will be entitled to probate,' and that 'The character of a will as being
contingent or not contingent in its operation depends on the intention
of the testator as expressed in the will itself, without the aid of extrinsic
evidence in the form of subsequent declarations made by the testator in
an incidental way as to the disposition of his property.' Then, as here,
there is no condition expressed nor implied in the paper; if there is sufficient evidence of its execution and publication it should be probated. Its
execution is proven as required by the statute, and is not questioned.
"The paper is testamentary in substance, was signed by the decedent,
attested by two witnesses at her request, and although she did not declare
it to be her will to them, yet the presumption is that she published it as
such. But it is contended by appellants that the writing on the envelope
shows that its publication was conditional, and the condition not being
fulfilled, there was no publication. The execution and publication, however, was of the paper itself as a will, and not of the writing on the envelope as a part of it, and was complete and perfect. The writing did not
refer to the publication, which is not affected by it, and is only a declaration made after the execution of the paper of her intention that the will
should be conditional; but as this intention was not expressed in a writing signed by her, it could not revoke or annul the unconditional testamentary disposition in the paper, and the decision of the register admitting it to probate must be affirmed and the appeal dismissed." 9
In Davis' Estate' o the language of the paper offered for probate was that
certain dispositions were to be made "Should I dye in the near future." The paper
was held to be testamentary in character, citing McCune's Estate," and per Sadler,
J., it was declared that the language as quoted, if conditional, was still within the
facts of the case as the testator had died within a little more than three months
9 Cf. Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. 159 (1881).
10 274 Pa. 126 (1912) 118 A. 645.
11 265 Pa. 523 (1920) 109 A. 156.
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thereafter and as the word "near" is a relative term the Court was convinced that
the construction in favor of the disposition as made by the lower court was correct.
In Kimmel's EstateI2 the language of the testamentary paper was, infer alia,
"if enny thing hapens." This was held to be a condition but as pointed out by
the Court was still existing when the testator died suddenly on the same day he
wrote and mailed the letter which was the basis of the testamentary disposition.
The above three cases are undoubtedly sound in their ultimate conclusions,
but it is submitted that the expressions concerning conditional wills arc misleading and not in accord with the trend of the cases.
On the other hand in Dowling's Ertate"3 there is an example afforded of
sound determination on this question. The paper in the handwriting of the decedent read as follows:
"Phila. June 25th 1919.
"To whom it may consern that I. Michael P. Doweling is to go on
opperation for a groth in the head if anything serious should happen
to me I leave all I own to Catherine Jane Doebley for what she has done
for me in the past consisting of
The house at 459 E. Moyer St.
1... .. 915 E. Columbia Ave.
Bank account Land Title Bld g.
Phila Saving Fund
Yours truly
Witnesses:
Matilda Isell
163 W. Gerard Ave.

MICHAEL DOWLING
Nellie F. McDevitt
1029 N. Front St.,'

This paper was probated by the Register and an appeal was taken, the petition averring and the answers admitting that at the time of the execution of the
writing the decedent was about to undergo a surgical operation; that he did undergo the operation and subsequently recovered therefrom and lived nearly twelve
years thereafter. The sole question was one of law, whether the instrument was
conditional or absolute. Stearne, P. J. held that the writing was absolute and after
reviewing the authorities concluded:
"I have carefully considered the words of the present instrument,
and have formed the opinion that the testator merely recited the facts
of the impending operation as the motive which induced him to write
his will; that decedent was contemplating the possibility of death generally and expressed his desires with respect to the disposition of his estate
in such event. I can discover no expressed or implied intention to stay
his testamentary provisions unless death resulted solely from or because
of the operation. Putting the matter in slightly different words: The
12 278 Pa. 435 (1924)

123 A. 405.

16 D. & C. 381 (1932) per Stearne, P.J. and Sinkler, J. Stearne, J., now of the Supreme
Court, see Morrison's Estate, supra, note (1).
18
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statement of the impending operation and the contemplation of the possibility of death was the occasion for making the will at that time and was
not the reason for making it in that particular way."
Upon exceptions the Court en banc, per Sinkler, J., dismissed the exceptions
and confirmed absolutely the decree of the presiding judge, reviewing the pertinent
cases and thus concluded:
"The exceptions are dismissed upon the following grounds: First,
the tendency of the courts, particularly in recent times, is to construe a
will as an absolute one and not conditional; second, the contingency expressed in the instrument is to be considered as the occasion for making
the will at a particular time, not as the reason for making it a particular
way; third, the wording of the will indicates that the bequest was made
to Catherine Jane Doebley because of what she had done for him in the
past; fourth, the evidence discloses that the testator had preserved the
will among his other documents up until the time of his death, and that
his relations to the beneficiary, out of which his obligation to her arose,
remained unchanged up to the time of his death."
In Moore's Estate" there is a striking example of a homemade will and of
a case well decided upon correct principles. Forquer'sEstate1" is cited with approval and it would appear that earlier cases are impliedly overruled. Probably,
following established procedure,' 6 the next case to be decided would expectedly
overrule directly previous inconsistent cases. The Moore case was an appeal from
the order and decree of probate of the following paper:
"Johnstown Aug 1926
"I am writeing my Will if any thing Hapins to me Before I come
Home I will ten thousand to Mrs. Lizzie Lewis the rest of My Estate
to be Sold and all Debts Paid I to be laid way the Same as Bob all Debts
Paid the remainder to be Devided Between My Nephues, & Neic and Bob
Nephues & Neices and five Hundred to the Methodist Church and Five
Hundred to each of the Home and Foreigan Mishinary Cocity and Five
Hundred to the Cemetery Accation to Keep the Graves and Lots of
Moores and Bushs in repair this is my Will I write and Sign
Mrs. Annie S. Moore"
It was contended that the will was conditional and according to the agreed
statement of facts the testatrix shortly after writing the paper in question did
make a journey to Cincinnati and remained there about three weeks, later returning and dying almost twelve years later, viz: March 8, 1938. Linn, J. in affirming
the order of the lower court explained:
"Contemplating her visit to Cincinnati, she may have intended her
will (a) to be effective only if she died before returning, or (b) she may
14 332 Pa. 257 (1938)

2 A.2d. 761.

15 See note 6, supra.
16 Cf. Wertheimer's Estate, 286 Pa. 155 (1926)

133 A. 144, and Weber v. Kline, 293 Pa.
85 (1928) 141 A. 721 for study of gradual change in doctrine of meretricious relations and undue
influence. This was the hope of this writer expressed before Morrison's Estate, supra, was decided.
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have referred to the proposed visit as explaining why she made her will
at that time. In the first case, her will would be effective if she died
before returning, but of no effect if she returned; in the second case the
will would be regarded as an absolute paper which, not having been
revoked, was entitled to probate."
The learned justice then quoted with approval Forquer's Estaie, iupra. and
particularly a quotation from that case already given herein, after which the justice
observed:
"While the paper might have been less ambiguous if testatrix had
punctuated it, we must deal with it as it appears in the record; its ambiguity requires consideration of the circumstances in which it was written. We think her reference to the proposed trip to Cincinnati was intended as an explanation why, at that time, she made her will, to be effective whenever she might die, unless, of course, she revoked it; instead
of revoking it, she retained it until her death twelve years later. Her conduct supports the inference that she did not wish to die intestate."
There are in the Pennsylvania reports very few cases exemplifying true types
of conditional wills. However, these are striking and apt examples. In Hamilton's
Estate17 the testator was confronted with a situation that required very grave consideration. He desired to make certain changes in his will which contained important charitable bequests and at the same time it was doubtful whether in executing a new will he would live the period of one calendar month. Apparently guided
by able counsel, testator executed a codicil referring specifically to the law relating to bequests to charities and then stipulated:
"Now, I declare said will of 20th November, 1871, to be my last
will should I die before the first of March, 1873, otherwise the will of
January 13, 1873 shall be my last will."
The testator died in the 23rd of January, 1873, and it was held that the paper
of November, 1871 constituted his will and that the writing of January 13, 1873
was not his will as the contingency on which it was to become so had not happened and it did not therefore revoke the will of 1871. Said Williams, J.:
"It is clear that the testamentary paper of January 13th 1873 admitted to probate by the register, cannot be regarded as the will of James
Hamilton. It is not his will, for the contingency upon which it was to
take effect never happened; Todd's Will, 2 W. & S. 145. It was a provisional will, and was only to become operative if he did not die before the
1st of March 1873; if he did, it was to have no force or effect. He died
on the 23d of January, 1873, and therefore, by the express provisions of
the codicil to which it is subject, it did not take effect as his will. If,
then, it never had any force or validity as a will, did it revoke the will
of the 20th November 1871, which was also admitted--to probate by the
register? It did not revoke it in express terms, for it contains no revoking
clause. It did not revoke it by implication, for the contingency upon
a will, it did not take effect at all, and was as powerless to revoke the
17 74 Pa. 69 (1873).
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prior will as if it had never been made. But if it had contained a revoking
clause it does not follow that it would have repealed the former will.
The fair construction in such case would be that the clause was intended
only to operate if the paper took effect as a will; but if not, then it was
to have no effect: Rudy -v. Ulrich, 19 P. F. Smith 177."
In Bradish v. McClellan 8 the companion case to Hamilton'r Est,, supra, it
was held that the codicil as executed by the testator did not fall with the latter will and consequently the legatees and devisees therein named were entitled
to the benefits conferred upon them thereby, Mercur, J. thus explained:
"When the testator executed the codicil, he was uncertain, which
of the former writings would take effect as his will. It depended on the
contingency of his dying before the time specified. There, however, was no
contingency stated in regard to the codicil. There was no intimation that
it should not take effect in either case. The clear intent was that it should
have full effect and attach itself to whichever writing became operative
as a will. The codicil was to become a part of that writing, and the two
constitute the whole will. Any presumption that the codicil and the writing of January 13th were both executed at the same time, is clearly rebutted by the reference in the codicil to the latter as a writing then existing.
"The conclusion to which we have come is not in conflict with the
point decided in Bradish's Appeal, supra, properly understood. The
main question there was whether effect should be given to the writing of November 1871 in regard to charitable bequests therein. They
were held to be valid. No person claiming under the codicil was a party
to that issue. Hence the rights of the defendant were not there discussed
nor decided. There is a dictum in the opinion as to the intent of the codicil, to which we cannot agree. We cannot therefore hold that sufficient
to defeat the title which we think the defendant so clearly took under the
codicil, to the land in question. The learned judge correctly held that
the plaintiff could not recover."
These cases merit considerable study and reflection particularly in comparison
with Hariman's Estate19 where a banker who was the friend and advisor of the
testatrix prepared her will using the printed form obtainable from a legal stationer and containing a printed clause of revocation of all prior wills. This will
was executed July 28, 1932 and by its terms specifically revoked all prior wills.
There was a prior will dated July 29, 1931 containing numerous charitable bequests. Unfortunately the testatrix died July 29, 1932, within one day after the
execution of the 1932 will, thus giving rise to various questions before the auditor whether the bequests and devises in the 1932 will to the charitable and religious institutions named therein were voided as falling within the thirty-day
provision of Section 6 of the Wills Act of June 7, 1917.20
18 100 Pa. 607 (1882).

19 320 Pa. 321 (1936) 182 A. 234. See Wills Act of 1947, Sec. 7 (1) and comment on
change of the law, Report of Joint State Govt. Commission, pages 41 and 42.
20 P. L. 403, 20 PS 195, supp.
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As to whether a will is conditional as has already been stated is a matter of
law and for the court to determine. The general rule of construction is that the
condition must clearly appear from the language employed. Futhermore, a recital of the circumstances inducing the testator to execute the will is not to be so
construed. 21 Again, in the matter of construction, the court is at liberty to use
extrinsic evidence just as is pointed out in cases establishing testamentary intent. 22
However, parol evidence is not admissible to show that a will absolute on its face
2
was intended to be conditional. 3
In Morrison'sErtateN4 Stearne, J., inter alia, observed:
"Whether a will is conditional or not depends upon whether the
event which constitutes the expressed contingency is construed to have
been the occasion for making the will at a particular time or the reason
for making it in a particular way. (Citing cases)
"The words in the will in In re Moore's Estate, 332 Pa. 257, 2 A.
2d. 761, 762, and those in the present case are almost parallel. In In re
Moore's Estate, they are ' * * I * if any thing Hapins to me Before I
*
'; in the present case they are' * * * if I never see
come Home*
' In Moore's Estate, the testatrix wrote the will
you again. '
in contemplation of a trip which she took to Cincinnati; she stayed three
weeks, returned to her home and lived twelve years thereafter. This Court,
in an unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Linn, construed the reference
to the trip as the reason for making the will at that time, and held the
bequests to be absolute. Construing the words in the present case, it
is clear that the possibility of never seeing the son again was the reason
for making the will at that time. The words 'keep this it may be of use
to you some day' would negative any presumed intention that testator
intended the gift to fail if he should see his son again. Under the facts
and principles stated in Moore's Estate, supra, such construction must
prevail unless the meaning of the words was modified by the proven
conditions surrounding the testator."
The last sentence in the above quotation would indicate that the language
of this will might be "modified" by certain proven facts and this is evidently what
was in the mind of the learned court below, but in the opinion just quoted had
not been "proven" but was merely a matter of surmise or conjecture. It is suggested that the same rule in reference to the admission of any evidence on what
the testator meant in the language used must be confined as above indicated in
21 8 Ann. Cas. 115-; Mechem and Atkinson's Cases, 252 and notes 255; Eaton v. Brown,
193 U, S. 411 (1904) 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487, 48 L.Ed. 720, per Holmes, J.; 11 A.L.R. 846; 18 Mich.
L. Rev. 168, 351, 23 Col. 2 Rev. 403, 36 Yale L.J. 887.

Testamentary Character and Intent, 48 DL.R. 22 (1943).
Gardner on Wills, 2d. Ed. 61; Sewel v. Slingluff, 57 Md. 537 (1882); Cf. Clark v. Hugo,
130 Va. 99 (1921) 107 S. E. 730; also Lister v. Smith. 3 Swabey & T. 282 (1863) 164 Eng. Reprint 1282, where Sid J. P. Wilde admitted parol evidence showing codicil was cxecuted without
serious intention when such evidence "is very cogent and conclusive." But quere. The general rule
is better, unless the purpose is to show lack of testamentary character and intent. Evidence of conditions surrounding testator at the time of execution is admissible.
24 361 Pa. 419 (April 11, 1949) 65 A. 2d. 384.
22
28
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this article in the same way as in ascertaining the testamentary character and in25
tent of a written instrument.
As the language appears in the Morrison case there is no condition and if
any is read into such language it would have to be by judicial interpolation.
Vills with Conditions
Instead of a will being conditional which, if found by the court, will render
it totally inoperative, it may contain conditions attached to the several bequests
or devises. In this instance the will is probative and the questions later arise on
distribution as to the conditions that may be attached to the several gifts. The subject, therefore, comes up properly under the head of distribution of estates, but
by reason of its connection with the topic of conditional wills, a few of the principles will now be illustrated.
Conditions may be either precedent or subsequent and although it was remarked in Alexander's Estate26 that the distinction between conditions precedent
and conditions subsequent under certain situations is somewhat tenuous and technical, yet under other circumstances the distinction is quite important, as appears
in Thompson's Estate27 where the testator bequeathed in equal joint ownership
to three persons certain property conditioned upon the formation by them of a
partnership within one year after the death of the testator and stipulating further
some of the terms of the agreement of the required partnership. One of the legatees was a minor and his guardian refused to enter into the proposed partnership.
In affirming the decree of the orphans' court, Walling, J. explained:
"This may be a hard case, but we agree with the conclusion of the
orphans' court. Whether a condition shall be construed as precedent or
subsequent depends upon the intention of the testator as expressed in
the will. 40 Cyc. 1689. Here the primary intent was to have the business
continued in the name of Thompson Brothers, with some member of his
family interested therein. As to this, we adopt the language of the orphans' court: 'An examination of the entire will satisfies us that Mr.
Thompson's prime purpose was to see that his business should continue
under the trade name which he had used in his lifetime, and that one
person of his own (family) should be a member of the partnership contemplated. To make certain that this relationship should be brought about,
he designated, first of all, the partners and the share of each in the assets and profits of 'their firm' and then when he had provided for this
and for the purpose of assuring its future, he'devised his business property to those beneficiaries, if, and only if, the partnership should be
formed within one year from his death. It seems clear, therefore, that
this condition was inseparably annexed to the gift and not a limitation
upon its enjoyment. It is, therefore, a condition precedent.' It was optional with the legatees whether they would accept the bequest, subject
25 See note 22, supra.
26 341 Pa. 471 19 A.2d. 374. (1941).
27 305 Pa. 349 (1931) 155 A. 925.
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to the condition, but they could not take it otherwise. The intent of
the testator could be carried out only by forming the partnership and
taking over the property as such. The time for performance of the condition here being definitely limited to one year is a circumstance indicating that it is a condition precedent. Whereas, the fact that the time of
performance is indefinite leads to the opposite conclusion. See Finlay
v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. 346 8 Curtis Dec. 438, 44, 7 L. Ed. 710; 28
R.C.L. p. 312. A devise to a son to be void if he is living with his divorced wife is a condition precedent and if he is not living with her at testator's death the estate vests. McKinley v. Martin, 226 Pa. 550, 75 A. 734,
134 Am. St. Rep. 1076. There seems to be no case in Pennsylvania directly in point, but it is stated in 40 Cyc. 1 1698, citing McCallum v. Riddel, 23 Ont. 537, that a bequest may be made upon condition that a partnership should be formed. A legacy given, provided the legatee appears
and establishes his identity within a specified time, is on a condition precedent (Stover's Appeal 77 P. 282; Campbell v. McDonald, 10 Watts,
179; 40 Cyc. 1692) and the principle is not different where a bequest is
given on a condition that a partnership be formed within a stated time.
Each is a necessary qualification to a receipt of the gift. A gift to A if he
marry B within a year after testator's death would be a condition precedent, and there is no essential difference between marrying within a
year and forming a partnership within that time."
In Alexander's Estate2 8 it was held that where testator after bequests to his
wife and others provided that the residue of his estate should be retained and the
income divided among three sons on condition that, if the widow contested the
will or was not wholly satisfied with it, then the widow's son by testator should
receive only $5.00; the condition was a valid condition precedent and was not
invalid as a condition subsequent, "in terrorem". It was further explained that the
rule "in terrorem" was derived from the civil law and is that a condition subsequent which is against public policy, public decency or good manners, will be
treated as in terrorem unless there is a specific devise over. Parker, J. declared:
"The appellant's assertion that the testator intended that the provision we are considering should operate as a condition subsequent to the
vesting of Arthur's Estate is equally untenable. The distinction between
conditions precedent and conditions subsequent as used in a statement of
the doctrine relied upon is, at best, tenuous and technical. In Holbrook's
Estate, 213 Pa. 93, 96, 62 A. 368, 369, 2 L.R.A., N.S., 545, 110 Am.
St. Rep. 537, 5 Ann. Cas. 137, we said: 'It is a reproach to the law that,
of two donors intending to do exactly the same thing, one shall succeed
and the other fail, as a violator of law, merely because one scrivener knew
what he was about, and wrote 'so long as the donee remains unmarried',
and the other was ignorant or careless, and wrote 'for life, if so long the
donee remains unmarried.' While the will of the testator in this case was
not precise in the use of legal expressions and was inartistic, it is manifest
that he intended, as we have heretofore said, to make alternative provisions for Arthur in order to avoid what he considered an inequitable
28 See note 26 supra,
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division between the two groups in his family. Until the widow made her
election it could not be determined which would be operative. It is clear,
however, that no interest was intended to vest in Arthur and no distribution could be made to him until the widow had made her election. Her
election to take under the will was d condition precedent to his participation in the remainder along with his brothers. Arthur was entitled to five
dollars and nothing more."
In Kauffman v. Burgert29 a testator devised to his son a fee simple estate in
land, and then directed that the estate should not be liable for his son's debts, and
further that his son should not sell and dispose of any part of the land and that
the same should go and vest in his heirs unless the 'son should devise the same
by his last will and testament which the testator authorized and empowered him
to do. It was held per Green, C.J. that the condition against alienation was void
and that the son took an absolute estate in fee simple and that the devise in fee
with the condition that it shall not be liable for the debts of the devisee was as
repugnant to the estate as the condition not to alien. 80
In M'Cullough's Heirs v. Gilmore3m a testator, after directing that "all his
worldly substance shall be disposed of"-proceeds to say that it is his will and
desire that a certain farm "fall into the possession of W., laying this injunction
and prohibition, not to leave the same to any but the legitimate heirs of W's
father's family at his, W's, decease." It was held that this evinces a general intent
to give the fee to W., with an apparent particular intent in relation to the power
of alienation, which particular intent is void, because inconsistent with a reasonable enjoyment of the fee, and also for uncertainty. Coulter, J. observed"A general restraint upon the alienation of a fee would be void.
A partial restraint has been allowed, when it was not inconsistent with a
reasonable enjoyment of the fee; as that the devisee shall not alien to a
particular person or in mortmain. Coke Litt. 223 a. And in the case of
M'Williams v. Neely, 2 S. & R. 513, Chief Justice Tilghman, in asserting the general doctrine, that, when an estate is given, any restraint upon
it which destroys its character is void, acknowledges that doctrine of the
case in Leonard, that a partial restriction not inconsistent with a reasonable enjoyment of the fee is good. In his case, however, the restriction is
uncertain. Whom did the testator mean by the heirs of his father's
family? A man's family may be considered as his household at a particular
period; or, as his race or generation. There is nothing in the will 3to2 designate or describe what the testator meant by his father's family."
In Hotz's Estates it was stated that though a bequest to which a condition
is appended in restraint of marriage is void, as against public policy, yet a testator
29 195 Pa. 274 (1900)

45 A. 725, 78 Am. St. Rep. 813.

30 See article, Illegal Conditinns in Grants of Property-John P. Martin, 46 D.L.R. 262 (194,2).
31 11 Pa. 370 (1849).
82 But see Pattin v. Scott, 270 Pa. 49 (1921) 112 A. 911 that a restraint on alienation for
25 years is void; also discussion 46 D.L.R. 265-7 (1942) Rood on Wills, 2nd. Ed. sec. 607; Yost
v. McKee, 179 Pa. 381 (1897) 36 A. 317.
83 38 Pa. 422 (1861)

80 Am. Dec. 490.
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may, by proper words of limitation, restrict the enjoyment of a bequest to the
period during which his legatee shall remain unmarried. Thus, where a testator
gave to his executors the sum of $5000, in trust to invest the same, after the
death of his wife, and pay the interest "unto my daughter-in-law, Mary H. Hotz,
wife of my son Peter, if she shall be living and the wife and widow of my son,
for her sole and separate use, upon her own receipt, and for and during all the
term she shall continue the wife or widow of my son," with a limitation over
for life to another, and a further disposition, in case of the death of the second
cestui que trust, if she should marry; the bequest was not upon a condition in
terrorem, but it terminated, upon her marriage, and passed into the residue of
the estate, to be disposed of under the will.
In McCullough's Appeal8 ' it was also observed that a devise over is not
essential to render a condition annexed to land and in restraint of marriage valid.
The per curiam statement is as follows:
"The provision for the wife, in this case, is a devise of the profits
and consequently of the land to her for life, in the first instance; but
coupled with a condition, or a conditional limitation, no matter which,
that she do not marry. Whether it be the one or the other, a limitation
over is unnecessary to give it effect, for it is a familiar principle that
devises of land, whether to a widow or any one else, are governed, not by
the civil, but by the common law, which knows nothing of a condition in
terrorem: as was determined in Commonwealth v. Stouffer, 10 Barr 350.
At her marriage, therefore, the wife's interest in the demised premises
ceased, but the interest of the children, her co-tenants, survived."
Likewise in Redding v. Rice8' where the testator gave his entire estate to
his wife "as long as she shall remain my widow and if she should get married
then she shall only be entitled to one-third in said property", there being a provision for the balance to go over to certain heirs, it was held that the widow took
a fee in the entire estate, defensible as to two-thirds upon her marriage, and the
widow not having remarried a conveyance by her in her lifetime gave, after her
death, an indefeasible estate to her grantee.
Again in Holbrook's Estates8 it was held that where a beneficiary is given
the income of a fund "during the term of her natural life, or so long as she shall
remain unmarried," with a gift over "in case of her death or marriage", the gift
is upon a limitation in favor of the beneficiary during the period she remains
unmarried and is valid. Such a provision is not to be construed as an unlawful
condition in restraint of marriage. Mitchell, C.J., pertinently observed:
"Distinctions and exceptions one after another sustained prohibitions which went merely against time or place, or particular persons, conditions with a gift over on breach, conditions in a gift of land, and
84 12 Pa. 197 (1849).
85 171 Pa. 301 (1895) 33 A. 330.

8 213 Pa. 93 (1905) 62 A. 368, 2 L.R.A. ns 545, 110 Am. St. Rep. 537, 5 Ann. Cos. 137;
comment, Rood on Wills, 2nd Ed. sec. 613.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

finally the distinction between conditions subsequent, working a divestiture, and conditions limiting the estate given. This last distinction is
logical enough, for where there is an estate given and the condition is
held void there is still the estate which may continue, while where the
estate itself is to last only so long as the condition is fulfilled there is
nothing left after the breach. But while this distinction is logical it is
dry technical logic with no basis of substantial reason for application in
the affairs of life. It is a reproach to the law that of two donors intending to do exactly the same thing one shall succeed and the other fail as
a violator of law merely because one scrivener knew what he was about
and wrote "so long as the donee remains unmarried," and the other was
ignorant or careless and wrote "for life if so long the donee remains
unmarried." Hoopes v. Dundas, 10 Pa. 75."
In Gunning's Estate (No. 1) testatrix, after directing the sale of her real
estate, gave certain legacies from the proceeds and then provided:
"The income of the balance to be given to K.M., provided he is
not living with the woman he married in 1899--one J.W., should she
die, or he is divorced from her-that is finally divorced-he is to be
given absolutely one half of the principal, and the interest of the other
half as long as he lives. If he marries again he can by will leave all to
his second wife and children. If he dies unmarried a second time without
children the one half---or all his share-is to be equally divided between
the children of W.G., C.G., and J.B. In no case is the present wife of
K.M. to benefit by anything I leave him either in personal or real estate."
At the time of testatrix's death K.M. was living with his wife, J.W., referred to
in the will. Held, that the condition annexed to the gift to K.M. was precedent,
was not originally either impossible or illegal, and that as he was living with his
wife, J.W., at testatrix's death, the condition annexed to his legacy was not fulfilled
and he was not entitled to take. Potter, J. declared:
"The rule which makes void gifts based upon a future separation of
husband and wife, would not therefore apply to this case. Then, too, the
fulfillment of the condition precedent was not originally impossible or
illegal; that is, as noted above, the death of the wife through natural
causes, or a separation uninfluenced by the knowledge of the contents
of the will prior to the death of testatrix, would have made it possible
to meet the conditions. It is therefore unnecessary to take into consideration any difference between the rule of the common law and that of the
civil law, which it is urged governs in the distribution of legacies as
distinguished from devises. The point here urged being, that the condition only is void, and that the gift should be held to be absolute."
In Frienrd'sEstates s the will contained this clause:
"If any of my children or grandchildren, or any of the cestuis que
trust under this will, shall contest the validity of this my will, or attempt
to vacate the same, or alter or change any of the provisions thereof, he or
she, or they, shall be thereby deprived of any beneficial interest under
87 254 Pa. 139 (1912)

88 209 Pa. 442 (1904)

83 A. 60, 49 L.R.A. ns 637.
58 A. 853, 68 L.R.A. 447.
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this will and of any share of my estate, and the share or shares of such
person or persons, shall be divided equally between my said sons, James
W. Friend and Harry T. Friend, discharged from any trust."
A son appealed from decree of probate and petitioned for an issue on the
ground that the execution of the will had been procured by undue influence. The
petition was dismissed by the court and on appeal the decree was affirmed. 89 It
was contended that in view of the litigation, the son had forfeited his interest in
the estate but this contention was not sustained by the court below which held the
son had probable cause for instituting the contest and therefore he had not forfeited the interest which his mother had given him. This determination was approved by the Supreme Court and in dismissing the appeal, Brown, J. explained:
"It is not to be questioned that it was competent for the testatrix, possessing the absolute power to dispose of what she possessed just
as she pleased, to impose the condition upon which the appellants rely
in asking that their brother shall be deprived of all interest in her estate;
and it is equally clear, in view of his attempt to annul her will, that the
burden is upon him to show that he now ought to have what it gives
him. Such conditions to testamentary gifts and devises are universally
recognized as valid, and, by some courts, enforcible without exception.
The better rule, however, seems to us to be that the penalty of forfeiture
of the gift or devise ought not be imposed when it dearly appears that
the contest to have the will set aside was justified under the circumstances,
and was not the mere vexatious act of a disappointed child or next of kin.
A different rule-an unbending one-that in no case shall an unsuccessful contestant of a will escape the penalty of forfeiture of the interest
given him, would sometimes not only work manifest injustice but accomplish results that no rational testator would ever contemplate."
In Hickman's Estate4 0 a will contained this clause: "Should anyone express
dissastisfaction with the provisions of this will, he or she shall forfeit his or her
interest." It was held that a testator may impose a condition of forfeiture of an interest in an estate if the beneficiary contests the will by which it is given, unless the
condition is against public policy or the law, and the above provision declared valid.
Furthermore, where a legatee had accepted his legacy, under the will and had
executed a release in full satisfaction and payment of all sum or sums of money,
legacies and bequests given and bequeathed, to him by the testator, such legatee
was not in a position to contest any provision of the will, particularly as no effort
or offer had been made to return the legacy. The observation was further made
concerning the release that it is well settled that where a beneficiary accepts a
legacy it is an election to stand by the provisions of a will.
In Berlin's Eslate" the will provided that any legatee presenting a claim
against the estate of the testator, should thereby forfeit his or her legacy, and it
89 46 D.L.R. 263 (1942); 125 A.L.R. 1136 N. 1139 N.
40 308 Pa. 230 (1932) 162 A. 168.
41 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 455 (1920).
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was held that such a condition is lawful upon which the testator had a right to
annex in a disposition of his own property. The legatee is not bound to accept
the bequest, but if it is accepted it must be subject to the condition annexed.
It must be taken with this burden or not at all. Sometimes a question has arisen
whether the particular condition has been broken and in McCahan's Estate (no.
2)42 it was stated that where a will directed that any of the legatees contesting or attempting to contest its provisions, should lose their legacies, a mere
caveat will not be construed as a contest of the will. It appeared in this case that
although the caveat was filed it was not pursued and did not ripen into a will
contest, howbeit there were some questions in dispute brought forward at the time
of the adjudication of the account. Likewise, in Mitchell's Estate,3 Stearne, J.
decided that a clause of a will providing for the forfeiture of the estate of any
beneficiary who shall interfere with the executors or trustees in the settlement of
the estate or make any claim or demand upon the estate otherwise than as provided
by the will, has no application to the action of a guardian ad litem for minor beneficiaries, and trustee ad litem for their unborn children, in questioning the executors' administration of the estate and in seeking a surcharge in respect to certain items of the account, observing:
"The insertion of the in terrorem clause in the will reflects testator's
apprehension that some individual might contest the probate of the will,
or make some claim which might frustrate his testamentary provisions.
As we read this will from its four corners, we can discover no evidence
of an intent to permit the settlement and distribution of this estate to
rest solely and exclusively in the hands of the testator's executors and
trustee, without accountability to any of the interested parties or
the supervision of the orphans' court. It is one thing to attempt to circumvent testamentary provisions and quite another to seek to enforce their
legal execution. If excessive counsel fee, commission, or other charges
are sought, or if the executors have unlawfully incurred losses in selling
or retaining the securities, or (merely for argument) suppose the executors were guilty of an actual devastavit, the parties in interest must
necessarily
a forded the opportunity of seeking relief. Such effort is
not against testamentary directions but in furtherance thereof. Upon the
probate of a will and the qualification of the executor, the assets of the
estate are in gremio legis. The administration of the estate has always
been held to be open to the fullest scrutiny of the interested parties and
of the orphans' court. It would require extraordinarily strong and unequivocal language (which does not exist here) to prohibit and preclude
an orderly judicial examination and adjudication of the executors' administration of the estate. We are of the opinion, and so decide, that in
the circumstances of this case there is no express or implied direction of
forfeiture where the ad litem guardian and trustee proceeds with his
obvious duty."
42 121 Pa. 188 (1908) 70 A. 711.
48 21 D. & C. 225 (1932).
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A devise may be expressed upon the condition that the devisee pay money
to another and such expressions have been the subject of construction by the
courts. In Hamilton v. Porter" a devise was made to Hamilton who was to take 100
acres of land and pay $700.00 to each of certain specified persons. It was held
that the legacies were not charged on the land and that Hamilton having accepted
the devise became personally liable for the legacies, and in Kennedy's Appeal s
the testamentary provisions read:
"I bequeath the said house to D, J and L, but subject to a ground
rent of $500 per annum to be paid in perpetuity ...if they will not
consent to pay the ground rent . . . then this devise shall become null
and void and said property shall return to my estate and for the uses
hereinafter specified."
It was held that the devisees took a fee and that the charge of the ground
rent was not a precedent condition. The operative words of the devise were held
to be present and vesting an immediate estate, while the words imposing the forfeiture for refusing consent to pay the rent imported a consequence taking effect
after the devise, and the devise is then to become null and void and the property
to return to the estate of the testatrix. Had testatrix intended the estate not to
vest until consent had been first given by a ground rent covenant, her evident
knowledge of the subject would have led her to say no. She had a clear apprehension of her own purposes and a ready command of language to express them
as was pointed out in an opinion by Agnew, iJ.

In Re McKallip's Estate"
There may be an odd situation where a will partakes of both a conditional
feature as well as the feature of some of the terms being made on condition. The
situation is illustrated by the McKallip case where a testatrix provided by codicil
as follows:
"I leave Ida Crurn Campbell authority to change my will according
to personal dictation-Boat sailing

Margaret J. McKallip
Nov. 15. 1922."

In the opinion by Drew, J., it was declared:
"The codicil clearly represents in lay fashion an intention to give a
collateral power of appointment-'an authority to deal with an estate,
no interest in which is vested in the donee of the power." Dickinson v.
Teasdale, I DeGex J.& S. 52, 60. When the intention to create a power
is plain, it should be given effect: no technical form of words is necessary.
Graeff v. De Turk, 44 Pa. 527.
44 63 Pa. 332 (1869).

45 60 Pa. 511 (1869).
40 324 Pa. 438 (1936) 188 A. 343.
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"Such a collateral power, broad as it is, does not violate our Wills
Act (20 PS. section 181 et seq.), which prescribes exclusive methods for
the revocation of wills. This has been held in other jurisdictions with
similar statutory limitations. Dudley v. Weinhart, 93 Ky. 401, 20 S. W.
308; Cf. Goods of John Smith, L.R. 1 P. & D. 717. Apparently Illinois
stands alone in an opposite view. Zierau v. Zierau, 347 Ill. 82. 179 N.E.
432, with critical comment in 27 I11. L. Rev. 297."
Statutory Conditions
In Section 7 of the Wills Act of 19474 7 are set forth a number of situations
in wills called "Modification By Circumstances", indicating that in addition to
the -matter already covered in this article explaining how a will may be affected
either conditionally or by conditions inserted by the testator himself, there are also
situations as pointed out in Section 7 of the Wills Act where a will as made is
affected by extraneous circumstances notably in matters of religious and charitable
gifts, divorce, marriage, and birth or adoption of children.
It is not within the scope of this article to discuss in detail such statutory conditions, but they are mentioned for the consideration of the reader.
47 See Report of Joint State Government Commission. page 40.

